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Abstract
This paper presents a simple model of strategic network formation with local com-
plementarities in eﬀort levels and positive local externalities. Equilibrium networks
display - other than the complete and the empty network - a core-periphery structure,
which is commonly observed in empirical studies. Ex-ante homogenous agents may
obtain very diﬀerent ex-post outcomes. These ﬁndings are relevant for a wide range
of social and economic phenomena, such as educational attainment, criminal activity,
labor market participation and R&D expenditures of ﬁrms.
Key Words: Network formation, peer eﬀects, strategic complements, positive ex-
ternalities. JEL Codes: D62, D85.
1 Introduction
Peer eﬀects and social structure play an important role in determining individual behavior
and aggregate outcomes in many social and economic settings. This has been documented
by a large body of empirical work, which ﬁnds peer eﬀects and network position crucial for
decisions concerning educational attainment, criminal activity, labor market participation
and R&D expenditures of ﬁrms. In these settings an agent's optimal action and payoﬀ is
thought to depend directly on the action or payoﬀ of others (peer eﬀects), while the relevant
reference group is determined by the network of relationships between agents (social struc-
ture). This stands in contrast to markets, where individuals interact through an anonymous
process of price formation.
This paper presents a model of strategic network formation in the presence of peer eﬀects.
In accordance with empirical studies, peer eﬀects are modeled as local positive externalities
∗I am grateful to my supervisors Fernando Vega-Redondo and Massimo Morelli for their invaluable support
and guidance. I also thank Sergio Currarini, Andrea Galeotti, Paolo Pin, Brian Rogers and the participants
of the Networks Working Group at the European University Institute and participants of the UECE Lisbon
Meetings 2010 for helpful comments. All remaining errors are mine. Contact: timo.hiller@bristol.ac.uk,
Address: Department of Economics, University of Bristol, 8 Woodland Road, BS81TN, UK.
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and strategic complementarities.1 The setup is fairly simple. Agents simultaneously choose
a non-negative eﬀort level and create links at a cost. We solve for two speciﬁcations of the
model. First, two-sided link formation, where linking cost are shared equally. Here, we use
Pairwise Nash equilibrium as equilibrium concept, since reﬂects the bilateral nature of cre-
ating a link (and sharing the cost). Second, one-sided link formation, where linking cost are
borne unilaterally. This speciﬁcation allows us to employ Nash equilibrium.2 The meaning
of a link is that agents beneﬁt directly from eﬀorts exerted by their neighbors (local positive
externalities). We assume payoﬀs such that the value function is convex. That is, when
best responding, own payoﬀs are convex in the sum of eﬀort levels of direct neighbors. For
both, one-sided and two-sided link formation, we show that equilibrium network structures
are of only three diﬀerent types: empty, core-periphery and complete.3 We deﬁne a com-
plete core-periphery network as a network where all agents in the periphery are connected
to the core. For the case of linear-quadratic payoﬀ functions, we provide necessary and suf-
ﬁcient conditions for the existence of a star network in the two-sided speciﬁcation and for a
periphery-sponsored core-periphery network in the one-sided speciﬁcation. These structures
are of particular interest, since they are frequently observed in empirical work.
Two related papers in the empirical networks literature are Calvó-Armengol, Pattacchini
and Zenou (2005 and 2009). The authors use a detailed data set on friendship networks in
U.S. high schools (AddHealth) to test a structural model with linear-quadratic payoﬀs on a
ﬁxed network. This allows for measurement of peer eﬀects in education and delinquent be-
havior, respectively. In both studies Calvó-Armengol, Pattacchini and Zenou ﬁnd a positive
relationship between grades and delinquency rates on the one hand and centrality on the
other hand. Network position turns out to be a key determinant for an individual's eﬀort
level. This emphasizes the importance of social structure for peer inﬂuences, as opposed to
average in-group eﬀects. In both papers local spillovers and strategic complementarities are
observed, much in line with the assumptions of my model. Further note that the linear-
quadratic payoﬀ function used in their model is a special case of the class of payoﬀ functions
considered here.
A recent paper by König, Tessone, and Zenou (2012) addresses link formation for the
linear-quadratic speciﬁcation. However, their link formation process is very diﬀerent. The
setup is dynamic and in each time period players play a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage,
1See Hoxby (2000), Sacerdote (2001) for a treatment of peer eﬀects in education, Glaeser, Sacerdote and
Scheinkman (1996), Case and Katz (1991) and Ludwig et al (2001) for criminal and delinquent behaviour,
Topa (2001) and Conley and Topa (2001) for labor markets and Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) and Levin
and Reiss (1988) for R&D expenditure of ﬁrms.
2Pairwise Nash equilibrium was ﬁrst discussed in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). For applications see, for
example, Goyal and Joshi (2003) and Belleﬂamme and Bloch (2004). The one-sided speciﬁcation follows
Bala and Goyal (2000).
3In a core-periphery network the set of agents can be partitioned into two sets, the core and the periphery,
such that all pairs of agents in the core are connected and no pair of agents in the periphery is connected.
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agents choose their eﬀort levels on a ﬁxed network, while in the second stage a randomly
selected player may create a new link in the current network, at no cost. Links decay
over time, with more valuable links decaying at a slower rate. König, Tessone, and Zenou
(2012) then introduce noise into the model and derive the stochastically stable networks.
Interestingly, these are shown to be nested split graphs, which subsume the core-periphery
structures obtained here.4 The approach undertaken by Galeotti and Goyal (2010) is similar
to mine. They also solve a simultaneous move game, where agents choose a non-negative,
continuous eﬀort level and link formation is one-sided. Externalities are also positive and
local, but diﬀerent from the paper presented here, Galeotti and Goyal (2010) assume strategic
substitutes. The only strict equilibria in Galeotti and Goyal (2010) are (complete) core-
periphery networks, a network architecture for which we provide necessary and suﬃcient
conditions in the linear-quadratic case. This is interesting from a theoretical point of view,
as it shows that in a model with continuous eﬀort levels, core-periphery networks are not a
feature of strategic substitutes alone, but may also arise under strategic complementarities.
The model presented by Baetz (2012) is also closely related. The setup is as in the one-sided
link formation speciﬁcation of my paper, but instead of convex value functions, Baetz assumes
concave value functions. A complete characterization is not yet obtainable, but it can be
shown that biregular bipartite graphs and core-periphery networks may be sustained in
equilibrium. Finally, Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006) exhibits some similarities
with my work. Again the presence of a link allows agents to beneﬁt from each other's eﬀort
levels and payoﬀs are linear-quadratic. Diﬀerent from my paper, however, Ballester, Calvó-
Armengol and Zenou (2006) assume not only local strategic complementarities, but also
allow for global strategic substitutes. The authors then link equilibrium actions to Bonacich
centrality on a ﬁxed network.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model and introduces
the two-sided speciﬁcation. Section 3 presents the analysis and Section 4 concludes. The
proofs for the one-sided speciﬁcation are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Two-Sided Model
2.1 Model Description
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} with n ≥ 3 be the set of players. Each agent i chooses a personal
eﬀort level xi ∈ X and announces a set of agents to whom he wishes to be linked to, which
we represent as a row vector gi = (gi,1, ..., gi,i−1, gi,i+1, ..., gi,n−1), with gi,j ∈ {0, 1} for each
j ∈ N\{i}. Assume X = [0,+∞) and gi ∈ Gi = {0, 1}n−1. The set of agent i′s strategies is
4A nested split graph is a graph such that, if the link between i and j exists and the degree of k is at
least as high as the degree of j, then the link between i and k also exists.
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denoted by Si = X × Gi and the set of strategies of all players by S = S1 × S2 × ... × Sn.
A strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) ∈ S then speciﬁes the individual eﬀort level for each player,
x = (x1, x2, ..., xn), and the set of intended links, g = (g1,g2, ...,gn). A link between i and
j, denoted with g¯i,j = 1, is created if and only if both agents intend to create a link. That is,
g¯i,j = 1 if gi,j = gj,i = 1, and g¯i,j = 0 otherwise. From g we thereby obtain the undirected
graph g¯ with g¯i,j = g¯j,i. The presence of a link g¯i,j = 1 allows players to directly beneﬁt
from the eﬀort level exerted by the respective other. Let Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : gi,j = 1} be
the set of agents to which agent i extends a link and denote the corresponding cardinality
with ηi(g) = |Ni(g)|. Deﬁne the set of i′s neighbors in g¯ with Ni(g¯) = {j ∈ N : g¯i,j = 1}
and deﬁne ηi(g¯) = |Ni(g¯)|. The aggregate eﬀort level of agent i′s neighbors in g¯ is written
as yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj. We drop the subscript of yi when it is clear from the context. Given
a network g¯, g¯ + g¯i,j and g¯ − g¯i,j have the following interpretation. When g¯i,j = 0 in g¯,
g¯ + g¯i,j adds the link g¯i,j = 1, while if g¯i,j = 1 in g¯, then g¯ + g¯i,j = g¯. Similarly, if g¯i,j = 1
in g¯, g¯ − g¯i,j deletes the link g¯i,j, while if g¯i,j = 0 in g¯, then g¯ − g¯i,j = g¯. The network is
called empty and denoted with g¯e, if g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N and complete and denoted with g¯c if
g¯i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈ N.
Payoﬀs of player i under strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) are given by
Πi(s) = pi(xi, yi)− ηi(g)k,
where k denotes the cost of extending a link. Gross payoﬀs pi(xi, yi) are a function of own
eﬀort, xi, and the sum of eﬀort levels of direct neighbors, yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj. We assume strict
positive externalities and strict strategic complementarities in eﬀort levels, so that ∂pi(x,y)
∂y
> 0
and ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
> 0. Further assume that ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂2x
< 0. The latter assumption, together with the
convexity of X, guarantees a unique maximizer, which is denoted by x¯(y). We also assume
x¯(y) > 0.5 From ∂
2pi(x,y)
∂x∂y
> 0 we know that ∂x¯(y)
∂y
> 0. Best response functions are assumed to
be either linear or concave, so that ∂
2x¯(y)
∂2y
= 0 or ∂
2x¯(y)
∂2y
< 0. Denote the value function with
v(y) = pi(x¯(y), y) and assume that ∂
2v(y)
∂2y
> 0. In order to guarantee existence, we further
assume that there exists a value of y such that ∂x¯(y)
∂y
< 1
n−1 .
One can easily check that pi(xi, yi) = xi − β2x2i + λxi
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj fulﬁlls the above condi-
tions. The class of payoﬀ functions described above therefore includes the linear-quadratic
payoﬀ function in Ballester, Pattachini and Zenou (2005 and 2009). The payoﬀ function
in Galeotti and Goyal (2010) is given by pi(xi, yi) = f(xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj) − c(xi), where f
is assumed to be concave and c is linear. By making appropriate assumptions on f and c,
we can generate a model of positive externalities and strategic complements that ﬁts our
setup.6 Link formation in Galeotti and Goyal (2010) is one-sided and we cover this case in
5This assumption guarantees that there does not always exist a Pairwise Nash equilibrium that is empty
(for any linking cost).
6Arguably the simplest such speciﬁcation is to assume pi(xi, yi) = (xi +
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj)
2 − x3i .
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the second part of the paper. First, however, we present the two-sided model and deﬁne
pairwise Nash equilibrium (PNE).
A strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) is a pairwise Nash equilibrium iﬀ
(i) s is a Nash Equilibrium, and
(ii) for all g¯i,j = 0, if Πi(x′i, x
′
j,x−i,−j, g¯ + g¯i,j) > Πi(s), then Πj(x
′
i, x
′
j,x−i,−j, g¯ + g¯ij) <
Πj(s), ∀x′i, x′j ∈ X.
Note that a network is pairwise Nash stable if it is both, a Nash equilibrium and pairwise
stable. Note also that due to the convexity of the value function, pairwise Nash stable and
pairwise stable networks coincide.7
2.2 Analysis
We start the analysis by providing a proof for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium on a ﬁxed network. Part of the proof relies on a result provided by Kennan
(2001). As in Kennan's paper, a vector b is larger than a vector a, if and only if bi > ai
∀i ∈ N.
Proposition 1: For any ﬁxed network, g¯, there exists a unique NE in eﬀort levels,
x∗(g¯).
Proof. We discern two cases. First, assume linear best response functions, such that
x¯i(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj) =
λ
β
∑
j∈Ni(g) xj +
1
β
. This allows us to use the existence result provided by
Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006). A NE exists and is unique for β > λµ1(g),
where µ1(g) is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of g¯. The largest eigenvector
for a graph lies between the following bounds max{davg(g¯),
√
dmax(g¯)} ≤ µ1(g¯) ≤ dmax(g¯),8
where dmax(g¯) is the maximum number of degree and davg(g¯) the average degree in network
g¯. Note that then the largest eigenvector for a graph with n agents is at most n − 1 (and
maximal and equal to n− 1 in the complete network, g¯c). Therefore, a suﬃcient condition
for the existence of a unique NE is that the slope of the best response function, λ
β
< 1
n−1 .
Second, assume strictly concave best response functions. Deﬁne the function fg¯ : Xn → Xn
as
fg¯(x) =

x¯(
∑
j∈N1(g¯) xj)
...
x¯(
∑
j∈Nn(g¯) xj)
.
The best response function x¯(y) is assumed to be strictly concave. From strategic com-
plementarities we know that x¯(y) is strictly increasing and therefore f is increasing and
7For the relationship between pairwise Nash stability and Nash stability, see Calvó-Armengol and lklç
(2009).
8See L. Lovasz, Geometric Representations of Graphs (2009).
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strictly concave. We can now apply a result provided by Kennan (2001), which is restated
here. Suppose f is an increasing and strictly concave function from Rn to Rn, such that
f(0) ≥ 0, f(a) > a for some positive vector a, and f(b) < b for some vector b > a. Then f
has a unique positive ﬁxed point. Recall that x¯(0) > 0 and therefore f(0) > 0. To see that
there exists a vector a such that f(a) > a, choose a = (ε1, ..., εn) such that εi = ε < 1n−1 x¯(0)
∀i ∈ N. The eﬀort level of an agents with ηi(g¯) neighbors is then given by ηi(g¯)ε. Since x¯
is strictly increasing x¯(ηi(g¯)ε) > x¯(0) > ηi(g¯)ε. To show that f(b) < b, choose a vector
b =(b1, ..., bn) with b = bi ∀i ∈ N . The condition can be written as x¯(ηi(g¯)b) < b, which
holds if b is suﬃciently large, due to the assumption that ∂x¯(y)
∂y
< 1
n−1 for some value of y.
To show that b > a, note that we can choose ε (and therefore a) arbitrarily close to zero
for x¯(ηi(g¯)ε) > x¯(0) > ηi(g¯)ε to hold. Q.E.D.
The following Lemma shows that agents in a complete component exert the same eﬀort
levels. This result will be useful for the equilibrium characterization.
Lemma 1: NE eﬀort levels are equal for all players in a complete component.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that there exists a pair of players k and l, such that
x∗k 6= x∗l , and, without loss of generality, that x∗k > x∗l . Note that in a complete com-
ponent Nk(g¯) \ {l} = Nl(g¯) \ {k}. But then, if x∗k > x∗l , the sum of eﬀort levels of l's
neighbors,
∑
j∈Nl(g¯) x
∗
j , is larger than the sum of eﬀort levels of k
′s neighbors,
∑
j∈Nk(g¯) x
∗
j .
We have reached a contradiction, as from strict strategic complementarities it follows that∑
j∈Nl(g¯) x
∗
j >
∑
j∈Nk(g¯) x
∗
j implies x
∗
l > x
∗
k. Q.E.D.
In Lemma 2 we show that eﬀort levels are maximal in the complete network. We use this
result to prove Proposition 3.
Lemma 2: NE eﬀort levels are maximal in the complete network.
Proof. Denote the Nash equilibrium eﬀort level in the complete network, g¯c, with xc∗,
where xc∗ = x∗i (g¯
c) ∀i ∈ N from Lemma 1. Start by deleting a link g¯i,j from g¯c and consider
each player's best response to xc∗in g¯c − g¯i,j. Agent i′s initial best response will be lower in
g¯c− g¯i,j than in g¯c, as
∑
j∈Ni(g¯c−g¯i,j) x
∗
j <
∑
j∈Ni(g¯c) x
∗
j . Iterating on best responses, any agent
l with g¯∗i,l = 1 will decrease his eﬀort level, and those sustaining links with l will decrease
their eﬀort levels in turn, and so forth. The eﬀort level of each agent is a decreasing sequence
of real numbers, which is bounded below by x¯(0).We have therefore established convergence
to a new equilibrium in g¯c − g¯i,j with x∗l (g¯c − g¯i,j) < x∗(g¯c) ∀l ∈ N. Note that any network
g¯ 6= g¯c can be obtained from g¯c by deleting a sequence of links. Eﬀort levels are weakly
decreasing at each step (strictly for any agent that is in the component from which a link is
deleted) and therefore eﬀort levels are maximal in the complete network. Q.E.D.
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Next, we deﬁne two cost threshold cost, k1and k2. The ﬁrst threshold, k1, is equal to the
gross marginal payoﬀs when a pair of agents creates a link in the empty network. Note that
under Pairwise equilibrium we allow both agents creating the new link to adjust their eﬀort
levels. The second threshold, k2, is deﬁned as the average gross marginal payoﬀs of linking
to (n− 1) agents in the complete network. Proposition 2 shows that for linking cost smaller
than k1, the unique pairwise Nash equilibrium is the complete network, while for linking cost
larger than or equal to k1, there exists a pairwise Nash equilibrium such that the network is
empty. Proposition 3 shows that for linking cost larger than k2, the unique pairwise Nash
equilibrium is the empty network, while for linking cost smaller or equal to k2, there exists
a pairwise Nash equilibrium such that the network is empty.
Deﬁnition 1: k1 = vi(x
∗
j(g¯
e + g¯i,j))− vi(0) and k2 = v((n− 1)x∗(g¯c))− v(0)
Proposition 2: If k < k1, then the unique PNE is the complete network. If k ≥ k1,
then there exists a PNE such that the network is empty.
Proof. From Proposition 1 we know that there exists a unique equilibrium in a network
where the only link is between i and j, g¯∗i,j = 1. Since i and j form a complete component,
x∗ = x∗i = x
∗
j (from Lemma 1) and the corresponding gross payoﬀs are given by v(x
∗
j(g¯
e +
g¯i,j)) = pi
∗
i (x
∗
i , x
∗
j). If k <vi(x
∗
j(g¯
e + g¯i,j)) − vi(0) = k1, then a pair of agents i and j ﬁnds
it proﬁtable to create the link g¯∗i,j. Note that this is the least proﬁtable link in any network,
due to the convexity of the value function v and strict strategic complementarities in eﬀort
levels. Therefore, every pair of agents must be connected for any k < k1 and the unique
PNE is the complete network. If, on the other hand k ≥vi(x∗j(g¯e + g¯i,j))− vi(0) = k1, then
no pair of agents can proﬁtably deviate in the empty network. Therefore, for k ≥ k1 a PNE
exists such that the network is empty. Q.E.D.
Proposition 3: If k > k2, then the unique PNE is the empty network. If k ≤ k2, then
there exists a PNE such that the network is complete.
Proof. The relevant deviation to consider in a complete network is an agent deleting
all his links. To see this, note that due to the convexity of v, v(hxc∗) − v((h − 1)xc∗) <
v((n− 1)xc∗)− v((n− 2)xc∗) for all 0 < h < n− 1. That is, marginal payoﬀs are increasing
and an agent will want to delete all of his links, if any. Therefore, the maximum linking cost
that can be sustained in the complete network are given by v((n− 1)xc∗)− v(0) = k2. Next
we show that if k = k2, then there exists no PNE other than the complete network or the
empty network. Assume that the most proﬁtable deviation of an agent i in network g¯ 6= g¯c
consists of deleting h of his ηi(g¯) =| Ni(g¯) | links. Note that n − 1 ≥ ηi(g¯) ≥ h. Denote
the network after proposed deviation with g¯′ and the set of agents whose links are deleted
by the deviating agent i with H = {j : g¯i,j = 1 ∧ g¯′i,j = 0}. We can then compare average
payoﬀs per link in the complete network g¯c∗ with payoﬀs in g¯ 6= g¯c and write
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v((n−1)xc∗)−v(0)
n−1 ≥ v(ηi(g¯)x
c∗)−v(ηi(g¯)xc∗−hxc∗)
ηi(g¯)−h >
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j−
∑
j∈H x
∗
j )
ηi(g¯)−h .
The ﬁrst inequality follows from the convexity of v, n− 1 ≥ ηi(g¯) and h ≥ 0. The second
inequality follows from the convexity of v and ηi(g¯)xc∗ − hxc∗ >
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j −
∑
j∈H x
∗
j
and hxc∗ >
∑
j∈H x
∗
j (for the last two inequalities, recall that eﬀort levels are maximal in
the complete network). Therefore, for linking cost k > k2, no links can be sustained and
the unique PNE is the empty network. For k ≤ k2 a PNE exists such that the network
is complete, since no agent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to delete his links from v((n−1)x
c∗)−v(0)
n−1 = k
2.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 3 shows that k1 < k2. We have therefore shown that, for linking cost smaller
than k1, the unique PNE is the complete network, while for linking cost larger than k2 the
unique PNE network is the empty network. For linking cost k ∈ [k1, k2] the complete and
the empty network are a PNE.
Lemma 3: k1 < k2.
Proof. k2 − k1 = v((n − 1)x∗(g¯c)) − vi(x∗j(g¯e + g¯i,j)). From Lemma 2 we know that
x∗(gc) > x∗j(g
e + g¯i,j) and since v is increasing, k2 − k1 > 0. Q.E.D.
Next, we formally deﬁne a core− periphery network as a network, such that the set of
agents can be partitioned into two sets, where all pairs of agents within the ﬁrst set (the
core) are connected and no pair of agents within the second set (the periphery) is connected.
Note that this deﬁnition does not state anything about links between pairs of agents where
one agent is in the core and the other is in the periphery. A complete core − periphery
network is deﬁned as a core-periphery network, in which all agents in the core are linked
to all agents in the periphery. Note that the star network is a special case of a complete
core-periphery network.
Deﬁnition 2: A network g is a core− periphery network if the set of agents N can be
partitioned into two sets C(g¯) (the core) and P (g¯) (the periphery), such that g¯i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈
C(g¯) and g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ P (g¯). A complete core− periphery network is a core− periphery
network such that g¯i,j = 1 ∀i ∈ C(g¯) and ∀j ∈ P (g¯). A star is a a complete core−periphery
network such that | C(g¯) |= 1.
In the following we provide three Lemmas which are useful for establishing our ﬁrst main
result in Proposition 4. Proposition 4 shows that any network that is not complete, empty,
or core-periphery is not a PNE. In Lemma 4 we prove that in any PNE, if an agent i
is linked to agent l, then agent i must also be linked to any agent k with higher or equal
eﬀort level than agent l. This is a direct consequence of the convexity of the value function.
Lemma 5 then shows that in any PNE, agents with same eﬀort levels must be connected to
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the same set of agents, while in Lemma 6 we prove that the neighborhoods of agents with
lower eﬀort levels are contained in the neighborhoods of agents with higher eﬀort levels.
Lemma 4: If g¯∗i,l = 1, then g¯
∗
i,k = 1 for all agents k with x
∗
k ≥ x∗l .
Proof. For g¯∗i,l = 1 to be part of a PNE, it must be that agent i and agent j can not
proﬁtably deviate by deleting the link. For agent i this condition reads v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) −
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k. From the convexity of the value function it then follows that
linking to any agent k with x∗k ≥ x∗l is also proﬁtable for agent i. To see this, note that
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j + x
∗
k) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k. For
agent l to not be able to proﬁtably deviate by deleting his link with agent i, we need that
v(
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j −x∗i ) ≥ k. Note next that, for x∗k ≥ x∗l to hold we must have∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j ≥
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j , which follows directly from strict strategic complementarities.
Therefore, v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j+x
∗
i )−v(
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j)−v(
∑
j∈Nl(g¯∗) x
∗
j−xi) ≥ k.
We have therefore shown that if g¯∗i,l = 1, then agent i ﬁnds it proﬁtable to link to any agent
k with x∗k ≥ x∗l , while any agent k ﬁnds it proﬁtable to link to agent i and therefore g¯∗i,k = 1
for all agents k with x∗k ≥ x∗l . Q.E.D.
Lemma 5: In any PNE, x∗i = x
∗
k ⇔ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
Proof. First, Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i} ⇒ x∗i = x∗k. If g¯∗i,k = 0, then i and k
access the same eﬀort level, i.e. yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j = yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j and therefore
x∗i = x
∗
k. Assume next that g¯
∗
i,k = 1 and, without loss of generality, that x
∗
i > x
∗
k. But
then k accesses a higher eﬀort level than i, yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j < yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j , and we
have reached a contradiction. Second, x∗i = x
∗
k ⇒ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}. Assume
to the contrary that x∗i = x
∗
k and Ni(g¯
∗) \ {k} 6= Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}. Note that for x∗i = x∗k,
eﬀort levels accessed must be equal by strict strategic complementarities, so that yi = yk.
There must therefore exist an agent l, such that l ∈ Nk(g¯∗) and l /∈ Ni(g¯∗). For the link
g¯∗k,l = 1 to be in place in g¯
∗ we must have that v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k.
From yi = yk and the convexity of the value function we then reach a contradiction since
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j +xl)−v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j)−v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j −x∗l ) ≥ k. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6: In any PNE, x∗i ≤ x∗k ⇔ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
Proof. First, Ni(g¯∗)\{k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗)\{i} ⇒ x∗i ≤ x∗k. If g¯∗i,k = 0, then k accesses a weakly
higher eﬀort level, i.e. yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j ≤ yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j and therefore x
∗
i ≤ x∗k. Assume
next that g¯∗i,k = 1 and, without loss of generality that x
∗
i > x
∗
k. But then k accesses a strictly
higher eﬀort level than i, yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j < yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j , and we have reached a
contradiction. Second, x∗i ≤ x∗k ⇒ Ni(g∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g∗) \ {i}. Assume to the contrary
that x∗i ≤ x∗k and there exists an agent l such that l ∈ Ni(g¯∗) and l /∈ Nk(g¯∗). For the link
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g¯∗i,l = 1 to be in place in g¯
∗ we must have that v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k.
But from yi ≤ yk and the convexity of the value function we reach a contradiction since
v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j +xl)− v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j −x∗l ) ≥ k. Q.E.D.
We are now in the position to prove Proposition 4, which states that in any PNE, such
that there exists a pair of agents with diﬀerent eﬀort levels, the network must display a
core-periphery structure.
Proposition 4: In any PNE with a pair of agents i and j, such that x∗i 6= x∗j , the
network displays a core-periphery structure.
Proof. Rank agents by their eﬀort levels in increasing order, such that x∗1 ≤ x∗2 ≤ ... ≤
x∗n−1 ≤ x∗n. We know from Lemma 1 that the network is not complete, since there exists a
pair of agents i and j such that x∗i 6= x∗j . The network is not empty, as agents have identical
payoﬀ functions and singleton agents display equal eﬀort levels, x¯(0). First, we show that the
two lowest ranked agents, agent 1 and agent 2, are not connected. Assume to the contrary
that g¯∗1,2 = 1. From Lemma 4 we know that i must be connected to all agents, since x
∗
j ≥ x∗2
∀j ≥ 2. Lemma 6 then implies that the network is complete, since Ni(g¯∗)\{j} ⊆ Nj(g¯∗)\{i}
holds for agents j with x∗j ≥ x∗1 ∀j ≥ 1. But then x∗i = x∗j ∀i, j ∈ N by Lemma 1 and we have
reached a contradiction. Since the network is neither empty nor complete, at least one link
exists. Pick the agent i with the lowest subscript who has a link. If i has more than one link,
pick the link to the agent with the lowest subscript j.We discern two cases. First, agent i and
j are adjacent. As i is the agent with the lowest subscript to sustain a link, all agents with
lower subscripts have no links. All agents with a subscript higher or equal to i are connected
to each other. Again by Lemma 4 agent i is connected to all agents with subscripts higher or
equal than j and by Lemma 6, g¯∗l,m = 1 ∀l,m ≥ i. The periphery, P (g¯∗), consists of agents
with subscripts k < i, while the core, C(g¯∗), consists of agents with subscripts k ≥ i. Second,
agent i and j are not adjacent. Note that since g¯∗i,j = 1 and x
∗
i ≤ x∗j−1, we know by Lemma
6 that the link between j − 1 and j, g¯∗j−1,j = 1, also exists. Next, check for the link g¯∗j−2,j−1.
If g¯∗j−2,j−1 = 0, then by Lemma 6 no agent with a subscript lower than j − 2 is connected
to j − 1. Furthermore, no pair of agents with subscripts of lower or equal than j − 2 is
connected. Assume to the contrary that there exists a pair of nodes l,m with l ≤ m < j− 2
and g¯∗l,m = 1. By Lemma 4 we must then have that g¯
∗
l,j−1 = 1. This, however, contradicts
Lemma 6, since g¯∗j−2,j−1 = 0. The periphery, P (g¯
∗), consists of agents with subscripts k < j,
while the core, C(g¯∗), consists of agents with subscripts k ≥ j. If g¯∗j−2,j−1 = 1, check for the
link g¯∗j−3,j−2. If g¯
∗
j−3,j−2 = 0, then by above argument the periphery, P (g¯
∗), consists of agents
with subscripts k < j−1, while the core, C(g¯∗), consists of agents with subscripts k ≥ j−1.
If g¯∗j−3,j−2 = 1, proceed in descending order until a pair of adjacent agents is found that is
not connected and deﬁne the core and periphery accordingly. Note that such a link exists,
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since i and j were assumed to be not adjacent and therefore g¯∗i,i+1 = 0. This concludes the
proof. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 provides an existence result for core-periphery networks. If δpi(x,y)
δxδy
is suf-
ﬁciently small, i.e. if strategic complementarities are not too strong, then a core-periphery
network exists with at least three agents in the core for appropriately chosen k. Denote
the cardinality of the core with c(g¯∗) =| C(g¯∗) | and the cardinality of the periphery with
p(g¯∗) =| P (g¯∗) |. For ease of notation we will write c and p, respectively.
Proposition 5: For
δpi(x,y)
δxδy
suﬃciently small, there exist a linking cost k, such that a
PNE displays a core− periphery network with | C(g¯∗) |≥ 3.
Proof. Partition the set of agents into the core, C(g∗), with g¯∗i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈ C(g∗), and
the periphery, P (g∗), with g¯∗i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ P (g∗). Further assume that g¯∗i,j = 0 ∀i ∈ C(g∗)
and ∀j ∈ P (g∗). That is, we have a complete component, consisting of C(g∗), and a set
of singletons, P (g∗). Denote the PNE eﬀort level of an agent in the core of size c with
x∗c . Recall from Lemma 1 that agents in the core display the equal eﬀort levels. Note that
for δpi(x,y)
δxδy
suﬃciently small, eﬀort levels are arbitrarily close to x¯(0). The condition for
an agent in the core to not delete all his links (recall the argument from Proposition 3) is
given by v((c−1)x
∗
c)−v(0)
c−1 ≥ k. Note that for δpi(x,y)δxδy suﬃciently small this is arbitrarily close to
v((c−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
c−1 . Denote with x
′
p and x
′
c the eﬀort level in a deviation where a pair of agents
p ∈ P (g∗) and c ∈ C(g∗) create a link. The condition for an agent in the periphery to not
ﬁnd it proﬁtable to link to an agent in the core is given by v(x′c) − v(0) < k. Again, for
δpi(x,y)
δxδy
suﬃciently small, this is arbitrarily close to v(x¯(0)) − v(0). The condition can then
be written as, for δpi(x,y)
δxδy
suﬃciently small, v((c−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
c−1 > v(x¯(0)) − v(0). The inequality
follows from the convexity of v and c ≥ 3. We can therefore ﬁnd a value of k such that
v((c−1)x∗cl)−v(0)
l−1 ' v((c−1)x¯(0))−v(0)l−1 > k > v(x¯(0))− v(0) ' v(x′c)− v(0). That is, p will not ﬁnd
it proﬁtable to link to c. Q.E.D.
The following Lemma shows that for n = 3, the only PNE networks are the complete
and the empty network. Note that with n = 3, the core can consist of at most two agents.
Lemma 7: For n = 3 the only PNE networks are the complete and the empty network.
Proof. There are two conﬁgurations to consider. First, the star and second, two con-
nected agents. We start by showing that the star network is not a PNE for n = 3. Assume
to the contrary that g¯∗is a star network and n = 3. Denote the equilibrium eﬀort levels
with x∗c and x
∗
p for the center of the star and the two agents in the periphery, respectively.
Note ﬁrst that in a star x∗c > x
∗
p. We will show this for general n. Assume to the con-
trary that x∗p ≥ x∗c . But then the agent in the center accesses an eﬀort level of (n − 1)x∗p,
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while the periphery accesses x∗c . From x
∗
p ≥ x∗c it follows that (n − 1)x∗p > x∗c and therefore
x∗c((n− 1)x∗p) > x∗p(x∗c). We have reached a contradiction. Next, consider a deviation where
the two agents in the periphery create a link. Denote the eﬀort level of the peripheral agents
after proposed deviation with x
′
p. From strategic complementarities we know that x
′
p > x
∗
p.
The eﬀort level accessed by each agent after the deviation is then x
′
p + x
∗
c > x
∗
p + x
∗
c > 2x
∗
p.
The deviating agents access a higher eﬀort level than the agent in the center, while each
incurring the cost of two links. That is, if it is proﬁtable for the center of the star to sus-
tain his links, then it is proﬁtable for the periphery to link to each other. More formally,
v(x
′
p+x
∗
c)−v(x∗c) > v(x∗p+x∗c)−v(x∗c) > v(2x∗p)−v(x∗p) > k. The inequalities then follow from
x∗c > x
∗
p and the convexity of the value function. Assume next, that n = 3 and g¯
∗consists of
two connected agents and the third agent is a singleton. Denote by x∗c the eﬀort level of the
two connected agents and consider a deviation where a new link is created. Note again that
x
′
p > x
∗
c . By an analogous reasoning as above, v(x
′
p + x
∗
c) − v(x∗c) > v(x∗c) − v(0) > k and
v(x
′
p)− v(0) > v(x∗c)− v(0) > k. This exhausts all possibilities and we can conclude that the
only possible PNE networks for n = 3 are the complete and the empty network. Q.E.D.
The results obtained so far were obtained for the general class of payoﬀ functions deﬁned
in the model description. For Proposition 6 we assume special case of the linear-quadratic
speciﬁcation of Calvó-Armengol, Pattacchini and Zenou (2005 and 2009). Recall that this
payoﬀ function is given by pi(xi, yi) = xi− β2x2i + λxi
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj. In the following we obtain
a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a PNE with a star network. The
conditions are then restated as suﬃcient conditions in Corollary 1: If n ≥ 6 and either β,
the own concavity parameter is suﬃciently large, or λ, the parameter determining strategic
complementarities, is suﬃciently small, then there exists a linking cost k, such that star
network is a PNE. Note further that the convexity of the value function in the linear-
quadratic case is given by λ
2
β
, so that one can also state Corollary 1 in terms of the convexity
of the value function.
Proposition 6: If best response functions are linear, there exists a linking cost k, such
that a PNE with a star network exists if and only if β > (2 +
√
2)λ and one of the following
conditions holds:
• 1 + β2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 ≤ n < 1 + β
2
λ2
or
• 1 + β2
λ2
< n ≤ 1 + β2
λ2
+
√
β2(β+λ)2(β2−4βλ+2λ2)
(β−λ)2λ4 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 1: If best response functions are linear and λ suﬃciently small, or β suﬃ-
ciently large, then there exists a linking cost k, such that the star network is a PNE for
n ≥ 6.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
3 The One-Sided Model
3.1 Model Description
The one-sided speciﬁcation diﬀers from the two-sided model in that only one agent needs to
extend a link and bear the cost, in order for a pair of agents to beneﬁt from each others eﬀort
level. This allows us to use Nash equilibrium. Note that under Pairwise Nash equilibrium
pairs of agents can create only one link at a time and both agents may adjust their eﬀort
levels. Under Nash equilibrium we consider deviations where an agent may extend multiple
links (and simultaneously delete any subset of existing ones), but only the deviating agent
may adjust eﬀort levels. In the following we describe the model for the one-sided case. The
proofs are mostly similar to the ones in the two-sided speciﬁcation and therefore relegated
to the Appendix.
Let again N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players, with n ≥ 3 . As before, each player
i chooses a personal eﬀort level xi ∈ X and a set of links, which are represented as a row
vector gi = (gi,1,..., gii−1,gii+1,..., gin), where gij ∈ {0, 1} for each j ∈ N\{i}. Again assume
X = [0,+∞) and gi ∈ Gi = {0, 1}n−1. The set of strategies of i is denoted by Si = X×Gi and
the set of strategies of all players by S = S1×S2× ...×Sn. A strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) ∈ S
again speciﬁes the individual eﬀort level of each player, x = (x1,x2,..., xn), and a set of links
g = (g1,g2, ...,gn). Agent i is said to sustain or extend a link to j, if gi,j = 1 and to receive a
link from j, if gj,i = 1. The network of relations g is a directed graph, i.e. it is possible that
gi,j 6= gj,i. Let Ni(g) = {j ∈ N : gi,j = 1} be the set of agents i has extended a link to and
deﬁne ηi(g) = |Ni(g)|. Call the closure of g an undirected network, denoted by g¯ =cl(g),
where g¯i,j = max{gi,j, gj,i} for each i and j in N. Denote with Ni(g¯) ={j ∈ N : g¯i,j = 1}
the set of players that are directly connected to i. The eﬀort level of i′s direct neighbors
can then be written as yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) xj. We will drop the subscript of yi when it is clear
from the context. Given a network g, g + gi,j and g− gi,j have the following interpretation.
When gi,j = 0 in g, g + gi,j adds the link gi,j = 1, while if gi,j = 1 in g, then g + gi,j = g.
Similarly, if gi,j = 1 in g, g− gi,j deletes the link gi,j, while if gi,j = 0 in g, then g− gi,j = g.
The network is said to be empty and denoted by g¯e if g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ N and complete and
denoted by g¯c if g¯i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈ N.
Payoﬀs are of player i under strategy proﬁle s = (x,g) are given by
Πi(s) = pi(xi, yi)− ηi(g)k,
where k denotes the cost of extending a link. The assumptions on the payoﬀ function are
as in the one-sided speciﬁcation. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle s∗=(x∗,g∗) such
that
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Πi(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ Πi(si, s∗−i), ∀si ∈ Si, ∀i ∈ N,
Denote the directed equilibrium network by g∗ and the undirected equilibrium network
by g¯∗.
3.2 Analysis
Note that in Proposition 1, Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 we assume the network to be ﬁxed and
therefore these results carry over to the one-sided speciﬁcation. We start by showing that,
in any NE, there can be at most one link between any pair of players.
Lemma 8: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), there is at most one directed link between any pair
of agents i, j ∈ N.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In Lemma 9 we show, again due to the convexity of the value function, that in any Nash
equilibrium, if i extends a link to l, then i must also be connected to agent k, for any k such
that x∗k ≥ x∗l . Note that we do not require that i extends a link to k, but only that i and k
are connected. That is, k may be extending the link to agent i.
Lemma 9: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), if g∗i,l = 1 then g¯
∗
i,k = 1 ∀k : x∗k ≥ x∗l .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following Lemma shows that if i extends a link to l, then any agent k with a higher
or equal eﬀort level than i must also be connected to l. Again this follows from the convexity
of the value function.
Lemma 10: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), if g∗i,l = 1 then g¯
∗
k,l = 1 ∀k : x∗k ≥ x∗i .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Similar to the two-sided speciﬁcation, we again deﬁne two bounds, k1and k2. In Propo-
sition 7 we show that for k smaller than k1, the unique Nash equilibrium is such that the
network is complete, while for k larger or equal than k1, there exists a Nash equilibrium
such that the network is empty. Proposition 8 shows that for linking cost larger than k2, the
unique Nash equilibrium is such that the network is empty, while for k smaller or equal to k2,
there exists a Nash equilibrium such that the network is complete. Note that the thresholds
k1 and k2 are deﬁned diﬀerently from the two-sided speciﬁcation. Due to the convexity of
the value function, the most proﬁtable deviation in the empty network is to extend a link to
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all remaining agents (where no agent other than the deviating agent adjust his eﬀort level).
The second threshold, k2, is the maximal linking cost that can be sustained in the complete
network. Note that the network is directed in the one-sided speciﬁcation and, due to the
convexity of the value function, the agent with the fewest incoming links has the greatest
incentives to deviate. That is, the network that may sustain the maximum linking cost is
the one where incoming and outgoing links are evenly distributed. With n agents there are
n(n−1)
2
pairs of agents. For n odd this implies that when incoming and outgoing links are
evenly distributed, each agent has n−1
2
incoming and n−1
2
outgoing links. For n even, n
2
agents
have n
2
incoming and n−2
2
outgoing links and n
2
agents have n−2
2
incoming and n
2
outgoing
links. For simplicity we assume in the following that n is odd. Analogous results are easily
derived for n even.
Deﬁnition 2: k1 = v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 and k
2 = 1n−1
2
(v((n− 1)x∗(gc))− v(n−1
2
x∗(gc)).
Proposition 7: If k < k1, then the unique NE network is the complete network. If
k ≥ k1, then there exists a NE such that the network is empty.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Before proceeding to Proposition 8, we show that in any Nash equilibrium network that
is neither empty or complete, there exists and agent that extends at least one link and has
less than n−1
2
incoming links. This result is useful when proving that the network that can
be sustained at the highest linking cost is the complete network with evenly distributed
incoming links.
Lemma 11: In any NE network that is neither empty nor complete, there exists an
agent with ηi(g) ≥ 1 and ηi(g¯)− ηi(g) < n−12 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 8: If k > k2, then the unique NE is the empty network. If k ≤ k2, then
there exists a NE such that the network is complete.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 12 shows that k1 < k2. We have therefore shown that, for linking cost smaller
than k1, the unique NE is the complete network, while, for linking cost larger than k2, the
unique NE network is the empty network. For linking cost k ∈ [k1, k2] the complete and
the empty network are Nash equilibria.
Lemma 12: 0 < k1 < k2.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The following Lemma shows that in any Nash equilibrium, if a pair of agents exert same
eﬀort levels, then they must share the same neighborhoods. The proof is a direct consequence
of the convexity of the value function.
Lemma 13: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), x∗i = x
∗
k ⇔ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 14 shows that in any Nash equilibrium, if an agent i exerts a weakly lower eﬀort
level than another agent k, then agent i′s neighborhood is contained in k′s neighborhood.
Lemma 14: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), x∗i ≤ x∗k ⇔ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In Proposition 9 we show that in any Nash equilibrium, such that there exists a pair of
agents with diﬀerent eﬀort levels, the network displays a core-periphery structure.
Proposition 9: In any NE with a pair of agents i and j, such that x∗i 6= x∗j , the network
is a core-periphery network.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Next, we deﬁne a periphery-sponsored core-periphery network as a core-periphery network
where all agents in the periphery extend links to all agents in the core. A core-sponsored
core-periphery network is a core-periphery network where all agents in the core extend links
to all agents in the periphery.
Deﬁnition 3: A network g is a periphery− sponsored core− periphery network if the
set of agents N can be partitioned into two sets C(g) (the core) and P (g) (the periphery),
such that g¯i,j = 1 ∀i, j ∈ C(g), g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ P (g) and gi,j = 1∀i ∈ C(g) and ∀i ∈ P (g).
A network g is a core − sponsored core − periphery network if the set of agents N can
be partitioned into two sets C(g) (the core) and P (g) (the periphery), such that g¯i,j = 1
∀i, j ∈ C(g), g¯i,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ P (g) and gi,j = 1∀i ∈ C(g) and ∀i ∈ P (g).
Lemma 15: There does not exist a NE such that the network is a core sponsored
complete core-periphery network.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results obtained so far were obtained for the general class of payoﬀ functions deﬁned
in the model description. For Proposition 10 we assume special case of the linear-quadratic
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speciﬁcation of Calvó-Armengol, Pattacchini and Zenou (2005 and 2009). In the following we
obtain a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a PNE with a star network.
The conditions are then restated as suﬃcient conditions in Corollary 2: If n ≥ 6 and either β,
the own concavity parameter is suﬃciently large, or λ, the parameter determining strategic
complementarities, is suﬃciently small, then there exists a linking cost k, such that star
network is a NE. Note further that the convexity of the value function in the linear-
quadratic case is given by λ
2
β
, so that one can also state Corollary 1 in terms of the convexity
of the value function.
Proposition 10: If best response functions are linear, there exists a linking cost k, such
that a NE with a periphery-sponsored core-periphery network exists if and only if the number
of agents in the core, c, is smaller than n−1
2
and λ ≤ c(n−c)β
n−1+c((c−n)2−1) +
√
(n−c−1)2(c(n+1)−c2+1)β2
(n−c−1+(n−c)2) .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 3: If best response functions are linear andλ suﬃciently small, or β suﬃ-
ciently large, then for any periphery sponsored core-periphery network with c < n−1
2
, there
exists a linking cost k, such that g∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides a model of endogenous network formation with peer eﬀects for a general
class of payoﬀ functions, where peer eﬀects are assumed to induce positive local externalities
and strategic complementarities in eﬀort levels. These features are descriptive of a wide
range of social and economic and phenomena, such as educational attainment, crime, labour
market participation and R&D expenditures of ﬁrms. We solve the model for a two-sided
speciﬁcation, where both agents need to agree to form a link, and a one-sided speciﬁcation,
where links can be created unilaterally. In both cases the only Pairwise Nash equilibrium
and Nash equilibrium network structures are of three types: the empty, complete, and core-
periphery networks. For the case of linear-quadratic payoﬀ functions, we provide necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a star (in the two-sided speciﬁcation) and a
periphery-sponsored core-periphery network (in the one sided-speciﬁcation).
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6 APPENDIX A - The Two-Sided Model
Proposition 6: If best response functions are linear, there exists a linking cost k, such that
a PNE with a star network exists if and only if β > (2 +
√
2)λ and one of the following
conditions holds:
• 1 + β2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 ≤ n < 1 + β
2
λ2
or
• 1 + β2
λ2
< n ≤ 1 + β2
λ2
+
√
β2(β+λ)2(β2−4βλ+2λ2)
(β−λ)2λ4 .
Proof. First, note that in a star network, all agents in the periphery access the same
eﬀort level, x∗c , and therefore all agents in the periphery display the same eﬀort level, x
∗
p. The
agent in the center, c, therefore maximizes xc ∈ argmaxxc∈Xxc− β2x2c+λxc(n−1)xp, while for
an agent in the periphery we have xp ∈argmaxxp∈Xxp− β2x2p +λxpxc. The reaction functions
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are given by xc(xp) =
1+λxp(n−1)
β
and xp(xc) = 1+λxcβ . Equilibrium eﬀort levels are given by
x∗c=
β+λ(n−1)
β2−λ2(n−1) and x
∗
p =
β+λ
β2−λ2(n−1) . Plugging equilibrium eﬀort levels back into the payoﬀ
function, yields equilibrium gross payoﬀs of pi∗c =
β(β+λ(n−1))2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 and pi
∗
p =
β(β+λ)2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 . Next,
we calculate deviation payoﬀs of when two agents in the periphery create a link. Denote
with x1
′
p and x
2′
p the eﬀort levels of the two agents involved in the new link. A deviating
agent maximizes x1
′
p ∈argmaxx1′p ∈Xx1
′
p − β2 (x1
′
p ) + λx
1′
p (xc + x
2′
p ), which yields the following
reaction function x1
′
p (x
∗
c , x
2′
p ) =
1+λ(x∗c+x2
′
p )
β
. Due to symmetry, deviation eﬀort levels are
given by x1
′
p (x
∗
c , x
2′
p ) = x
2′
p (x
∗
c , x
1′
p ) = x
′
p =
β2+λβ
(β−λ)(β2−λ2(n−1)) and corresponding deviation
gross payoﬀs by pi′p =
β3(β+λ)2
2(β−λ)2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 . For the existence of a star network we now need
two conditions to hold. First, we want to ﬁnd a linking cost k, such that an agent in the
periphery ﬁnds it proﬁtable to link to the center of the star, but, given the link with the
center, does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to link to another agent in the periphery. This condition
can be written as β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − 12β ≥ β
3(β+λ)2
2(β−λ)2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 , where
1
2β
are the
payoﬀs of a singleton, so that on the left hand side we have marginal payoﬀs of linking to
the center and on the right hand side marginal payoﬀs of linking to another agent in the
periphery, given the link with the center of the star. Second, we want to ﬁnd a linking cost
k, such that the center of the star ﬁnds it proﬁtable to link to the periphery, but that again
the periphery does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to link to another agent in the periphery. This
condition can be written as ( β(β+λ(n−1))
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − 12β )/(n−1) ≥ β
3(β+λ)2
2(β−λ)2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 − β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2(n−1))2 .
Combining these two conditions one can show that they simultaneously hold if and only if
β > (2 +
√
2)λ and one of the following conditions holds: 1 + β
2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 ≤ n < 1 + β
2
λ2
or
1 + β
2
λ2
< n ≤ 1 + β2
λ2
+
√
β2(β+λ)2(β2−4βλ+2λ2)
(β−λ)2λ4 .
9 Q.E.D.
Corollary 1: If best response functions are linear and λ suﬃciently small, or β suﬃ-
ciently large, then there exists a linking cost k, such that the star network is a PNE for
n ≥ 6.
Proof. First the case where λ is suﬃciently small. Note that then β > (2 +
√
2)λ holds.
Furthermore, for given β an λ suﬃciently small, 1 + β
2
λ2
is arbitrary large so that n < 1 + β
2
λ2
.
For 1 + β
2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 ≤ n to hold note that limλ→0 (1 + β
2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 ) = 6. Next, β suﬃciently large.
Again, β > (2 +
√
2)λ holds. Furthermore, for given λ and β suﬃciently large, n < 1 + β
2
λ2
holds. For 1 + β
2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 ≤ n to hold note that limβ→∞ (1 + β
2(5β−3λ)
(β−λ)3 ) = 6.
10 Q.E.D.
9These calculations were executed in Mathematica and the codes are available upon request.
10This calculations was executed in Mathematica.
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7 APPENDIX B - The One-Sided Model
Lemma 8: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗) there is at most one directed link between any pair of
agents i, j ∈ N.
Proof. Assume that s∗=(x∗,g∗) is a Nash equilibrium and that gi,j = gj,i = 1. But then
i can proﬁtably deviate by cutting the link to j, such that gi,j = 0. Gross payoﬀs remain
unchanged, while i's linking total cost decrease by k. Q.E.D.
Lemma 9: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), if g∗i,l = 1 then g¯
∗
i,k = 1 ∀k : x∗k ≥ x∗l .
Proof. For g∗i,j = 1 to be part of a NE, it must be that v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j −
x∗l ) ≥ k . Assume, contrary to the above statement, that g¯∗i,k = 0 for some k with x∗k ≥ x∗l .
This, however, can not be a NE, since i ﬁnds it proﬁtable to then extend a link to agent k.
To see this, note that v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j +xk)−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j)−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j−
x∗l ) ≥ k, where the inequalities follow from the convexity of the value function. We have
reached a contradiction and therefore g¯∗i,k = 1 for all agents k with x
∗
k ≥ x∗l . Q.E.D.
Lemma 10: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), if g∗i,l = 1 then g¯
∗
k,l = 1 ∀k : x∗k ≥ x∗i .
Proof. For g∗i,j = 1 to be part of a NE, it must be that v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j −
x∗l ) ≥ k . Assume, contrary to the above statement, that g¯∗k,l = 0 for some k with x∗k ≥
x∗i . Note next that, for x
∗
k ≥ x∗i to hold we must have
∑
j∈Nk(g¯) x
∗
j ≥
∑
j∈Ni(g¯) x
∗
j , which
follows directly from strict strategic complementarities. Therefore, v(
∑
j∈Nk(g) x
∗
j + x
∗
l ) −
v(
∑
j∈Nk(g) x
∗
j) > v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g) x
∗
j − xl) ≥ k, where the inequalities again
follow from the convexity of the value function and we have reached a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Deﬁnition 2: k1 = v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 and k
2 = 1n−1
2
(v((n− 1)x∗(gc))− v(n−1
2
x∗(gc)).
Proposition 7: If k < k1, then the unique NE network is the complete network. If
k ≥ k1, then there exists a NE such that the network is empty.
Proof. If k < k1 then an agent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to create a link to all remaining n− 1
agents in an empty network, since average payoﬀs per link are given by v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 with
v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 > k. This is the most proﬁtable deviation in an empty network, due to the
convexity of the value function. Assume there exists a g∗ /∈ {ge,gc} with k < k1. Consider
the deviation of an agent i, with ηi(g¯∗) < n−1, who links to all agents he is not connected to
in g∗, i.e. k /∈ Ni(g¯∗). To simplify notation, we write ηi forηi(g¯∗) in the following. Average
marginal payoﬀs per link of proposed deviation are given by
v(
∑
j∈Ni\{i} x
∗
j )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j )
n−ηi−1 .
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We can now write
v(
∑
j∈Ni\{i} x
∗
j )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j )
n−1−ηi ≥
v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(ηix¯(0))
n−1−ηi .
To see that the inequality holds, note ﬁrst that
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j ≥ ηix¯(0), since ηi(g¯∗) =|
Ni(g¯
∗) |and x¯(0) are the lowest possible eﬀort levels in any NE. Second, that∑j∈Ni\{i} x∗j −∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j ≥ (n− 1− ηi)x¯(0). That is, when linking to the remaining n− 1− ηi agents in
proposed deviation, the minimum additional eﬀort level accessed is given by (n−1−ηi)x¯(0).
The condition above then follows from the convexity of the value function. Note next that
v((n−1)x¯(0))−v((ηix¯(0))
n−1−ηi >
v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1
also holds, again from the convexity of the value function, and we therefore have
v(
∑
j∈Ni\{i} x
∗
j )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j )
n−1−ηi ≥
v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 > k.
Therefore, if k < k1 a proﬁtable deviation exists in any g∗ 6= gc. It is easy to see that
there then exists a NE with g∗ = gc for k < k1. If, on the other hand k ≥ k1, then no agent
can proﬁtably deviate in the empty network, and a NE exists such that g∗ = ge. Q.E.D.
Lemma 11: In any NE network that is neither empty nor complete, there exists an
agent with ηi(g) ≥ 1 and ηi(g¯)− ηi(g) < n−12 .
Proof. We discern two cases. First, everyone agent extends at least one link and receives
at least n−1
2
links. That is, ηi(g) ≥ 1 and ηi(g¯)− ηi(g) ≥ n−12 ∀i ∈ N. But then there are at
least n(n−1)
2
links in the network and the network is complete. Second, not everyone extends
a link. Assume there are k < n agents who extend a link. Since there are no incoming links
from the remaining n−k agents, the maximum number of incoming links among the k agents
extending a link is given by k(k−1)
2
. That is, on average an agent has k−1
2
incoming links.
The maximum of the minimum number of incoming links is given by k−1
2
. Since k < n, there
must be one agent with at most k−1
2
< n−1
2
incoming links. Q.E.D.
Proposition 8: If k > k2, then the unique NE is the empty network. If k ≤ k2, then
there exists a NE such that the network is complete.
Proof. We will ﬁrst show that the highest cost that can be sustained under the complete
network is given by k2. Denote the NE eﬀort level in a complete network with xc∗. In the
complete network the agent extending the highest number of links (and therefore receiving
the fewest number of links) is the one with the highest incentives to delete his links. To see
this, write
v((n−1)xc∗)−v((n−1−h)xc∗)
n−1−h >
v((n−1)xc∗)−v((n−1−h′)xc∗)
n−1−h′ ,
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where h′ > h > 0. The inequality holds by the convexity of the value function. The
network that minimizes the maximum number of links extended by agents in a network
is such that each agent extends n−1
2
links (and receives n−1
2
links). Therefore, the highest
linking cost that can be sustained in a complete network are given by k = k2. It is easy to
see that for k < k2 there exists a NE such that g¯∗ = g¯c. Assume next, and contrary to
the above statement, that for k > k2 there exists a NE such that g¯∗ 6= g¯e. k2 was derived
as the maximal payoﬀs sustainable in a complete network, and therefore for k > k2 there
is does not exist a NE such that g¯∗ = g¯c. Next, we show that for k > k2 there also does
not exist a NE with g¯∗ /∈ {g¯e, g¯c}. Assume the contrary. Pick an agent with less than n−1
2
incoming links, ηi(g¯∗)− ηi(g∗) < n−12 , and at least one outgoing link, ηi(g∗) ≥ 1. We know
from Lemma 8 that such an agent exists in g¯∗ /∈ {g¯e, g¯c}. We consider a deviation where this
agent deletes all his links. To see that this is proﬁtable, note that in the complete network,
the average marginal payoﬀ from extending links to all remaining agents is larger for an
agent with n−1
2
incoming links, than for an agent with fewer incoming links, i.e. for an agent
withηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗) < n−12 . From ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗) < n−12 we have n−1−(ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗)) > n−12 .
The following inequality then holds again by the convexity of v.
v((n−1)xc∗)−v(n−1
2
xc∗)
n−1
2
> v((n−1)x
c∗)−v((ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗))xc∗)
n−1−(ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗)) .
Note that, given ηi(g¯∗) − ηi(g∗) < n−12 incoming links, average marginal payoﬀs are
highest when linking to all remaining agents with eﬀort level xc∗. Asηi(g¯∗) is at most n− 1,
we can write
v((n−1)xc∗)−v((ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗))xc∗)
n−1−(ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗)) ≥
v(ηi(g¯
∗)xc∗)−v((ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗))xc∗)
ηi(g∗)
.
Last, note that eﬀort levels are maximal by Lemma 2 and by the convexity of v we
therefore have
v(ηi(g¯
∗)xc∗)−v((ηi(g¯∗)−ηi(g∗))xc∗)
ηi(g∗)
>
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j )−v(
∑
j∈Ni(g∗) x
∗
j )
ηi(g∗)
.
Average marginal payoﬀs are highest in the complete network where each agent extends
n−1
2
links and therefore for k > k2 the empty network is the unique NE.
Q.E.D.
Lemma 12: 0 < k1 < k2.
Proof. Recall the deﬁnitions of k1 = v((n−1)x¯(0))−v(0)
n−1 and k
2 =
2(v((n−1)xc∗)−v((n−1
2
)xc∗))
n−1 .
The inequalities then follow from x¯(0) > 0, xc∗ > x¯(0) and the convexity of the value
function. Q.E.D.
Lemma 13: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), x∗i = x
∗
k ⇔ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
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Proof. First, Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i} ⇒ x∗i = x∗k. If g¯∗i,k = 0, then i and k access
the same eﬀort level, i.e. yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j = yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j and therefore x
∗
i = x
∗
k.
Assume next that g¯∗i,k = 1 and, without loss of generality that x
∗
i > x
∗
k. But then k accesses
a higher eﬀort level than i, yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j < yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j , and we have reached a
contradiction. Second, x∗i = x
∗
k ⇒ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} = Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}. Assume to the contrary that
x∗i = x
∗
k and Ni(g¯
∗)\{k} 6= Nk(g¯∗)\{i}. Note that for x∗i = x∗k, eﬀort levels accessed must be
equal by strict strategic complementarities, so that yi = yk. For Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} 6= Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}
to hold, there must exist an agent l, such that l ∈ Nk(g¯∗) and l /∈ Ni(g¯∗). For the link g¯∗k,l = 1
to be in place in g¯∗ we must have that v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j −x∗l ) ≥ k. But from
yi = yk and the convexity of the value function v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j + xl) − v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j) >
v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j)− v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k holds and we reach a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma 14: In any NE s∗=(x∗,g∗), x∗i ≤ x∗k ⇔ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
Proof. First, Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗) \ {i} ⇒ x∗i ≤ x∗k. If g¯∗i,k = 0, then k accesses
a weakly higher eﬀort level, i.e. yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j ≤ yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j and therefore
x∗i ≤ x∗k. Assume next that g¯∗i,k = 1 and, without loss of generality, that x∗i > x∗k. But
then k accesses a strictly higher eﬀort level than i, yi =
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j < yk =
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j ,
and we have reached a contradiction. Second, x∗i ≤ x∗k ⇒ Ni(g¯∗) \ {k} ⊆ Nk(g¯∗) \ {i}.
Assume to the contrary that x∗i ≤ x∗k and there exists an agent l such that l ∈ Ni(g¯∗)
and l /∈ Nk(g¯∗). For the link g¯∗i,l = 1 to be in place in g¯∗, either g∗i,l = 1 or g∗l,i = 1. If
g∗i,l = 1, then v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k must hold. But from yi ≤ yk
and the convexity of the value function can write v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j + xl) − v(
∑
j∈Nk(g¯∗) x
∗
j) >
v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j) − v(
∑
j∈Ni(g¯∗) x
∗
j − x∗l ) ≥ k and we have reached a contradiction. We can
apply an analogous argument for g∗l,i = 1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 9: In any NE with a pair of agents i and j, such that x∗i 6= x∗j , the network
is a core-periphery network.
Proof. Rank agents by their eﬀort levels in increasing order, such that x∗1 ≤ x∗2 ≤ ... ≤
x∗n−1 ≤ x∗n. We know from Lemma 1 that the network is not complete, since there exists a
pair of agents i and j such that x∗i 6= x∗j . The network is not empty, as agents have identical
payoﬀ functions and singleton agents display same eﬀort levels, x¯(0). We start by showing
that the two lowest ranked agents, agent 1 and agent 2, are not connected. Two cases are
to be discerned. First, g∗1,2 = 1. From Lemma 9 we know that agent 1 must be connected
to all agents remaining agents, since x∗j ≥ x∗2 ∀j ≥ 2. Lemma 14 implies that the network
is complete since Ni(g∗) \ {j} ⊆ Nj(g∗) \ {i} holds for agents j with x∗j ≥ x∗1 ∀j ≥ 1. But
then x∗i = x
∗
j ∀i, j ∈ N by Lemma 1 and we have reached a contradiction. Second, g∗2,1 = 1.
From Lemma 10 we know that agent 1 is connected to all agents, since x∗j ≥ x∗2 ∀j ≥ 2 and
the above argument applies. Since the network is neither empty, nor complete, at least one
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link exists. Pick the agent i with the lowest subscript that is involved in a link and, if i is
involved in more than one link, consider the link to the agent with the lowest subscript j.
We discern two cases, g∗i,j = 1 and g
∗
j,i = 1. First, g
∗
i,j = 1. We can discern two subcases.
First, agent i and j are adjacent. As i is the agent with the lowest subscript involved in
a link, all agents with lower subscripts have no links. All agents with a subscript higher
or equal to i are connected to each other. To see this, note that by Lemma 9, agent i is
connected to all agents with a subscript higher or equal than j. But then by Lemma 14,
g¯∗l,m = 1 ∀l,m ≥ i. The periphery, P (g∗), consists of agents with subscripts k < i, while
the core, C(g∗), consists of agents with subscripts k ≥ i. The argument for the case where
g∗j,i = 1 is analogous. Assume next that i and j are not adjacent. Note that since g
∗
i,j = 1
and from x∗i ≤ x∗j−1, we know by Lemma 10 that the link between j − 1 and j, g¯∗j−1,j = 1,
also exists. Next, check for the link g¯∗j−2,j−1. If g¯
∗
j−2,j−1 = 0, then by Lemma 10 no agent
with a subscript lower than j − 2 is connected to j − 1. Furthermore, no pair of agents with
subscripts of lower or equal than j−2 is connected. Assume to the contrary that there exists
a pair of nodes l,m with l ≤ m < j − 2 and g¯∗l,m = 1. By Lemma 9 we must then have
that g¯∗l,j−1 = 1. This, however, contradicts Lemma 14, since g¯
∗
j−2,j−1 = 0. The periphery,
P (g∗), consists of agents with subscripts k < j, while the core, C(g∗), consists of agents with
subscripts k ≥ j. If g¯∗j−2,j−1 = 1, check for the link g¯∗j−3,j−2. If g¯∗j−3,j−2 = 0, then by above
argument the periphery, P (g∗), consists of agents with subscripts k < j − 1, while the core,
C(g∗), consists of agents with subscripts k ≥ j − 1. If g¯∗j−3,j−2 = 1, proceed in descending
order until a pair of adjacent agents is found that is not connected and deﬁne the core and
periphery accordingly. Note that such a pair of agents exists, since i and j were assumed to
not be adjacent and therefore g¯∗i,i+1 = 0. This concludes the proof. Q.E.D.
Lemma 15: There does not exist a NE such that the network is a core sponsored
complete core-periphery network.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that such a network is a Nash equilibrium. But then an
agent in the periphery receives links from all agents in the core, while an agent in the core
receives at most c − 1 links. Therefore, by the convexity of the value function, if an agent
ﬁnds it proﬁtable to link to all agents in the periphery, then agents in the periphery ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to link to all remaining agents in the periphery. Q.E.D.
Proposition 10: If best response functions are linear, there exists a linking cost k, such
that a NE with a periphery-sponsored core-periphery network exists if and only if the number
of agents in the core, c, is smaller than n−1
2
and λ ≤ c(n−c)β
n−1+c((c−n)2−1) +
√
(n−c−1)2(c(n+1)−c2+1)β2
(n−c−1+(n−c)2) .
Proof. Denote with c =| C(g∗) | . First, note that in a complete core-periphery network,
all agents in the periphery access the same eﬀort level, cx∗c , and therefore all agents in
the periphery display the same eﬀort level, x∗p. Agents in the core display identical eﬀort
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levels by an argument analogous to the one in Lemma 1. The agents in the core maximize
xc ∈ argmaxxc∈Xxc − β2x2c + λxc((n − 1)xp + (c − 1)xˆc), where xp is the eﬀort level of
agents in the periphery and xˆc and are eﬀort levels of (other) agents in the core. For an
agent in the periphery we have xp ∈argmaxxp∈Xxp− β2x2p +λxp(cxc). The reaction functions
are given by xc(xp, xˆc) =
1+λx′c(c−1)+λxp(n−c)
β
and xp(xc) = 1+λcxcβ , respectively. Equilibrium
eﬀort levels are given by x∗c=
β+λ(n−c)
β2−λ2c(n−c)−βλ(c−1) and x
∗
p =
β+λ
β2−λ2c(n−c)−βλ(c−1) . Plugging
equilibrium eﬀort levels back into the payoﬀ function, yields equilibrium gross payoﬀs of
pi∗c =
β(β+λ(n−c))2
2(β2−λ2c(n−c)−βλ(c−1))2 and pi
∗
p =
β(β+λ)2
2(β2−λ2c(n−c)−βλ(c−1))2 . Next, we calculate deviation
payoﬀs of of an agent in the periphery linking to all remaining agents in the periphery. A
deviating agent maximizes xdp ∈argmaxxdp∈Xxdp − β2 (x2p)2 + λxdp(cxc + (n − c − 1)xp), which
yields the following reaction function xdp(x
∗
c , x
∗
p) =
1+λcx∗c+λx∗p(n−c−1)
β
. The deviation eﬀort
level is given by xdp(x
∗
c , x
∗
p) =
(β+λ)(β+λ(n−k−1))
β(β2−λ2c(n−c)−λβ(c−1)) and corresponding deviation gross payoﬀs
by pidp =
(β+λ)2(β+λ(n−k−1))2
2β(β2−λ2c(n−c)−βλ(c−1))2 . For the existence of a periphery-sponsored core-periphery
network we need two conditions to hold. First, we want to ﬁnd a linking cost k, such that
an agent in the core ﬁnds it proﬁtable to link to agents in the core and, second, that agents
in the periphery ﬁnd it proﬁtable to link to the core, but not to the periphery. Note that if
agents in the periphery ﬁnd it proﬁtable to extend links to the core, agents in the core ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to extend the if agents in the periphery. To see this, note that an agent in the core
has n−c−1 incoming links and extends c−1 links to the core, while an agent in the periphery
has zero incoming links and extends c links to the core. The relevant condition then reads
( β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2c(n−c)−βλ(c−1))2 − 12β )/c ≥ ( (β+λ)(β+λ(n−k−1))β(β2−λ2c(n−c)−λβ(c−1)) − β(β+λ)
2
2(β2−λ2c(n−c)−βλ(c−1))2 )/(n − c − 1).
One can then show that this condition holds if and only if the number of agents in the core,
c, is smaller than n−1
2
and λ ≤ c(n−c)β
n−1+c((c−n)2−1) +
√
(n−c−1)2(c(n+1)−c2+1)β2
(n−c−1+(n−c)2) .
11 Q.E.D.
Corollary 3: If best response functions are linear andλ suﬃciently small, or β suﬃ-
ciently large, then for any periphery sponsored core-periphery network with c < n−1
2
, there
exists a linking cost k, such that g∗ is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Note ﬁrst that λ ≤ c(n−c)β
n−1+c((c−n)2−1) +
√
(n−c−1)2(c(n+1)−c2+1)β2
(n−c−1+(n−c)2) is increasing in β and
therefore, for β suﬃciently large, λ ≤ c(n−c)β
n−1+c((c−n)2−1) +
√
(n−c−1)2(c(n+1)−c2+1)β2
(n−c−1+(n−c)2) holds. Next,
note that c(n−c)β
n−1+c((c−n)2−1) +
√
(n−c−1)2(c(n+1)−c2+1)β2
(n−c−1+(n−c)2) > 0 for c <
n−1
2
and β > 0. Therefore, for
λ suﬃciently small, the inequality again holds. Q.E.D.
11This calculation was executed in Mathematica and the codes are available upon request.
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